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NOTES
Granting Charitable Tax Exemptions
to Racially Discriminatory Schools
INTRODUCTION
Since Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,' the legal
battle to eliminate racial discrimination in the public schools has
evolved through a long series of judicial decisions into a legisla-
tive and judicial struggle encompassing private educational sys-
tems as well. 2 When religiously affiliated educational institutions
'347 U.S. 483 (1954). The mandate of Brown is also applicable to the federal gov-
ernment through the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497,500 (1954). After the Supreme Court's decision in Brown, a large number of
white-flight schools were founded, first in the South, to avoid the effects of public school
desegregation. In Mississippi, for example, only five "white-only" non-sectarian schools
existed in 1964-65. The next year, however, after new desegregation guidelines were im-
plemented, 20 new segregation academies came into existence. Note, Federal Tax Benefits
to Segregated Private Schools, 68 COLuM. L. REV. 922, 924 (1968). Recently, white-flight
schools have been opening in the northern and middle states. In Louisville, Kentucky and
Boston, Massachusetts, a large increase in the number of private schools occurred after de-
segregation plans were announced. See Note, Racial Discrimination-Section 1981 Appli-
cable to Private School Admissions, 25 KAN. L. REv. 247, 251 (1977) (citing N.Y. Times,
June 26, 1976, at 9, col. 2).
The effect on public school desegregation of this private school growth is conspi-
cuously revealed by the statistics of the Philadelphia public and private school systems. In
Philadelphia, approximately 40 % of the students attend parochial and private schools. Al-
though only 30% of the population is non-white, 57% of the public school students are
non-white. More whites attend private and parochial schools than attend public schools.
This trend could result in public schools being populated almost exclusively by minorities,
while private and parochial schools have mostly a white enrollment. Note, The Wall of
Racial Separation: The Role of Private and Parochial Schools in Racial Integration, 43
N.Y.U. L. 1REv. 514, 514 (1968) (quoting a statement by former Mayor Richard Dil-
worth).
2 See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) ("[While parents have a
constitutional right to send their children to private schools and a constitutional right to se-
lect private schools that offer specialized instruction, they have no constitutional right to
provide their children with private school education unfettered by reasonable government
regulation.").
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are involved, any state action aimed at preventing discrimination
invariably creates a labyrinth of constitutional problems. A legal
issue that has recently resurfaced in both the legislative and judi-
cial arenas is the question of extending tax-exempt status to pri-
vate schools which practice racial segregation in accordance with
their religious beliefs.
I. BACKGROUND
Until 1970, all private schools, regardless of their racial pol-
icy, enjoyed tax-exempt status under section 501(a) and 501(c) (3)
of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.).3 Donors' contributions to
those schools were also deductible under I.R.C. section 170. 4 In
3 See Note, The Judicial Role in Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax Exempt
Private Schools, 93 HAlv. L. BEv. 378,379-80 (1979-80). I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976) speci-
fies the types of organizations which qualify for tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(a):
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organ-
ized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or education purposes, or to foster national or inter-
national amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities in-
volve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention
of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of
the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting
to influence legislation, (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and
which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candi-
date for public office.
Private sectarian schools are included in the broad class of quasi-public corporations desig-
nated as "charities" exempt under I.R.C. § 501(a) from the payment of federal income
taxes. See Schwarz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: When Should the Church Ren-
der unto Caesar?, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 50,52 (1976-77).
4 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (1976) providesinpart:
(c) Charitable Contributions Defined.-For purposes of this section, the
term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use
of-
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation-
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational purposes ....
The economic impact of disallowing the charitable contributions would most affect
schools such as Bob Jones University. Several studies have demonstrated that charitable
contributions have significantly increased because of the current deductibility provisions.
See, e.g., Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part 1-Aggregate
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1970, however, the judiciary began considering a series of cases
which resulted in the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issuing a
revenue ruling which disqualified any private school lacking a
"racially non-discriminatory policy" from tax-exempt status or
deduction benefits under I.R.C. sections 501(c)(3) and 170.- This
rapid policy reversal by the IRS came in response to the first of
those cases, Green v. Kennedy,6 in which black Mississippi par-
ents and schoolchildren were granted a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the IRS from according tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory schools in that state.
Thereafter, a permanent injunction was issued in Green v.
Connally.7 In this case, the I.R.C. provisions on charitable
exemptions and deductions were construed so as to avoid frus-
trating the federal policy against racial segregation.8 To qualify
for benefits under the I.R.C., the court determined that any pri-
vate Mississippi school had to publicize the fact that it had a ra-
cially nondiscriminatory policy, and provide the IRS with infor-
mation on the racial composition of the school.9 In 1975, the IRS
announced new, more stringent qualification standards which
required schools to state a nondiscrimination policy in their char-
ters or bylaws, as well as in their brochures and catalogs.10 Some-
and Distributional Effects, 28 NATL TAxJ. 81,97 n.42 (1975) (if the current deduction for
charitable contributions were abolished, the effect would be a 25% to 50% reduction in
the amount of total individual giving).
5 Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. The Revenue Ruling concluded that if an or-
ganization was operated contrary to the sharply defined federal public policy against ra-
cial discrimination, it failed to qualify as charitable under the common law definition con-
templated in I.R.C. § § 170 and 501(c)(3). The ruling recognized a clearly delineated fed-
eral policy against discrimination in education as exemplified by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of
Topeka, 347 U.S. at 483 and Titles IV and VI, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Hi
2000e, 2000c-6 and 2000d (1976). Rev. Rul. 71-447,1971-2 C.B. at 230-31.
6 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398
U.S. 956 (1970).
7 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd mem. sub nom. Colt v. Green, 404 U.S. 997
(1971) (per curiam). The precedential value of the Supreme Court's affirmance of Green
v. Connally is limited because the case was not decided in an adversarial context. On ap-
peal, there was no disagreement because the IRS had reversed its position. See Bob Jones
Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725,740 n.11 (1974).
8 330 F. Supp. at 1164-65.
9 Id. at 1179-80. The rationale of Green v. Connally was extended to religious
schools in Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314
(E.D.N.C. 1977), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981).
10 Rev. Proc. 75-50,1975-2 C.B. 587.
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what less stringent publicity requirements, however, were
adopted for religious schools." Civil liberties groups charged that
these new guidelines focused only upon the schools' proclama-
tions of nondiscrimination rather than upon their actual oper-
ation. 2
Once again the IRS prepared new and more expansive guide-
lines to identify racially discriminatory schools.13 Under these
guidelines, schools which were formed or expanded when public
school desegregation occurred and which have a minority enroll-
ment of less than 20% of the minority school age population in
the community would be considered discriminatory. 14 The bur-
den of clearly and convincingly rebutting a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination would then be shifted to these
schools. 15 After public opposition to the proposed guidelines be-
came apparent, the Tax Commissioner revised them once more
to provide that before a school was characterized as "review-
able,"'16 it would have an opportunity to demonstrate its prior
good faith effort to recruit minority students or to show special
circumstances which curtailed the school's ability to attract a mi-
n See id. at 588. For example, if 75% of the enrollment of a church-related school
belonged to the church, the school was permitted to publish its nondiscriminatory policy
in religious newsletters or circulars.
12 See statement of Richard E. Larson on behalf of the American Civil Liberties
Union (Dec. 5,1978) reprinted in Proposed IRS Revenue Procedure Affecting Tax Exemp-
tion of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 481, 483 (1979). Schools were able to comply
with the formal IRS publication guidelines yet nonetheless continued to discriminate. See
Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
House Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 252, 253 (1979) (statement of Jerome
Kurtz). The revised revenue procedures attempted to develop "guidelines to identify cer-
tain private elementary and secondary schools that are racially discriminatory, even
though they claim to have a racially nondiscriminatory policy." Announcement 79-38,
1979-11 I.R.B. 33. See also, Note, supra note 3, at 381.
13 See Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt Schools, 43 Fed. Beg.
37296 (1976).
14 Id. at §§ 3.03, 4.02.
I, Id. at § 4.02. The school would then be designated as "reviewable." Id. at §§
3.03,4.02.
16 Three criteria had to be met for a school to be characterized as reviewable: (1) it
must have been formed or substantially expanded at the time of public school desegrega-
tion; (2) there must be no significant minority enrollment; and (3) creation or expansion
must have been related in fact to the community's public school desegregation. Proposed
Revenue Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt Schools, 44 Fed. Reg. 9451, 9452 (1979).
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nority enrollment.17
In 1979, the United States House of Representatives passed
an amendment denying the IRS any funds for fiscal year 1980 to
formulate or carry out any guidelines which would disqualify a
private school from tax-exempt status unless the guidelines were
in effect prior to August 22, 1978.18 Further amendment denied
funds for the revenue proceedings. 19 The Senate eventually
adopted both amendments to the Treasury Appropriations Bill,2°
but a ban on implementing the revenue procedures was extended
into fiscal year 1981.21
An important chapter in the troubled history of the tax
exemption question involved Bob Jones University of Greenville,
South Carolina.22 Bob Jones University is a private sectarian
17 Id. at § 3.03(b).
18 125 CONG. 1Ec. H5879-86 (daily ed. July 13,1979).
19 125 CONG. REc. H5979-83 (daily ed. July 16,1979).
20 Id. at S11979-87 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1979). Treasury, Postal Service, and General
Government Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, § 103, 93 Stat. 559 (1979).
The Fourth Circuit in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 150 n.3 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981) viewed the Act as being prospective, thus de-
ciding that it had no effect on the decision in that case. See also 125 CONG. REC. 115879,
5882 (daily ed. July 13, 1979).
21 See Pub. L. No. 96-536,94 Stat. 3166 (1980).
22 Bob Jones University's tax exempt status has generated controversy for almost a
decade, and has been the subject of considerable litigation. The case discussed in this Note
Is Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978) [Bob Jones 1]. It was
decided a little more than a year ago after the Eastern District of North Carolina's decision
in Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. at 1314. Goldsboro
Christian also dealt with the tax exempt status of a private school which followed racially
discriminatory practices based upon fundamentalist religious beliefs.
In 1981, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued separate decisions in the two
cases, affirming the decisions of both lower courts. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
639 F.2d at 147 [Bob Jones II]; Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 644
F.2d at 879. The Fourth Circuit held in both cases that the educational institutions in
question were not entitled to tax exempt status. Because of the similarity of the issues in-
volved, the proximity in time of the decisions by the court, and the fact that the two cases
were appealed from the same circuit, the United States Supreme Court has granted cer-
tiorari in the two cases and will decide them as companion cases. 102 S. Ct. at 386.
Bob Jones University has been involved in other litigation. These cases are not dis-
cussed in depth in this Note, but will be briefly summarized as follows. The university at-
tempted to get an injunction preventing the IRS from revoking its tax-exempt status in Bob
Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. at 725. The Supreme Court held that I.R.C. § 7421(a)
(1976) foreclosed the issuance of an injunction before the assessment or collection of a tax,
unless the plaintiff could show irreparable harm and it was clear that the government
could not prevail. Because the controversy was resolved on other grounds, the Court did
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school dedicated to the teaching and propagation of fundament-
alist religious beliefs; all courses at the university are taught ac-
cording to the Bible, although the school is not affiliated with
any particular religious institution.0 One of the fundamental
precepts of Bob Jones University is that the Bible absolutely pro-
hibits interracial dating and marriage.Y Blacks were refused ad-
mission to Bob Jones University until 1971, and in the next four
years, only married blacks and unmarried black staff members
were admitted.as After the Fourth Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals decided McCrary v. Runyon,1 which held that
42 U.S.C. section 19817 prohibited racial discrimination in ad-
missions to private, nonsectarian schools,2s Bob Jones University
revised its admissions policy in 1975 to allow unmarried blacks to
enroll. 9 However, the school instituted a new set of disciplinary
procedures to prevent interracial marriage and dating. 30
not decide whether tax-exempt status could be denied to a religious organization. Id. at
740 n.11. For other litigation involving Bob Jones University, see Bob Jones Univ. v. John-
son, 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.D. 1974), aff'd mere sub nora Bob Jones Univ. v. Roudebush,
529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975) (veterans benefits denied to Bob Jones University and its stu-
dents under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because of its policy of excluding un-
marriedblacks).
23 468F. Supp. at 894.
24 Id. A similar belief was the basis of a defense made in Brown v. Dade Christian
Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
Dade Christian Schools' first amendment free exercise defense to a 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1976) claim was rejected, however, because the district court found that the schools' seg-
regation rule was predicated on social policy or philosophy rather than on the exercise of
religion. 556 F.2d at 312-13.For the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, see note 27 infra.
2 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. at 894.
26 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). See generally Com-
ment, Section 1981 After Runyon v. McCrary: The Free Exercise Right of Private Sectar-
ian Schools to Deny Admission to Blacks on Account of Race, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1219.
27 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white cit-
izens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, li-
cense, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
28 515 F.2d at 1087.
29 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. at 894-95.
'1 Id. at 895. The rule implementing this policy stated:
There is to be no interracial dating.
1. Students who are partners in an interracial marriage will be expelled.
2. Students who are members of or affiliated with any group or organiza-
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The IRS revoked Bob Jones University's tax-exempt status in
1976. 31 After being refused a tax refund, Bob Jones University
filed suit to challenge the revocation of its tax-exempt status as a
violation of its first amendment right of religious freedom. 32 The
district court held that the revocation of Bob Jones University's
tax-exempt status exceeded the legitimate authority delegated to
the IRS by Congress,-" contravened the plaintiffs free exercise
rights,, and inexorably led to the establishment of religion.s
After the Fourth Circuit reversed on all three grounds,e Bob
Jones University appealed to the Supreme Court, and certiorari
was granted.Y7
Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the entire issue
of the tax-exempt status of discriminatory schools was thrown
into political and judicial turmoil. In a complete reversal of fed-
eral policy in effect for more than a decade, the treasury depart-
ment announced that the IRS would no longer deny tax-exempt
status to private schools that practice racial discrimination. 8
Furthermore, the justice department asked the Supreme Court to
dismiss the Bob Jones University case as moot, since it was reinsti-
tuting the University's tax-exempt status.9 This announcement
produced an immediate outcry from both civil liberties groups
and members of Congress. 40 With charges of racism being di-
rected against it, the Reagan administration moved quickly to
defuse the situation, asking Congress to enact legislation to expli-
tion which holds as one of its goals or advocates interracial marriage will be
expelled.
3. Students who date outside their own race will be expelled.
4. Students who espouse, promote, or encourage others to violate the Uni-
versit's dating rules and regulations will be expelled.
Id.
31 Id. at 893.
32 Id. at897.
33 Id. at 901.
34 Id. at 899.
5 Id. atgol.
3° Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d at 150-55.
37 102S. Ct. at386.
38 N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1982, at 1, col. 2. The justification given for the reversal in
policy was that authority to enforce the federal anti-discrimination policy properly be-
longed to Congress, not to the taxing authorities.
'1 Id. at 10, col. 6.
40 Id., Jan. 10,1982, § 1, at 18, col. 1, 2.
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citly authorize the IRS to deny tax-exempt status to racially dis-
criminatory schools. 4 The indication from Congress was that
there was little chance for the passage of such a law42 because,
contrary to the justice department's opinion, the IRS already had
the authority to deny tax-exempt status. Indeed, congressional
leaders suggested that they would be willing to pass a resolution
affirming their view that the IRS had this authority. 43 In the
wake of these events, the justice department again reversed itself
and requested that the Supreme Court deny the motion it had
made to dismiss the case against Bob Jones University as moot. 44
This Note will first examine whether the IRS has the statu-
tory authority to deny tax exemptions to discriminatory private
institutions. It will discuss whether granting tax exemption "sub-
sidies" to discriminatory schools constitutes state action denying
equal protection to the parties that have been discriminated
against by the schools. Further, it will explore the first amend-
ment ramifications of denying tax-exempt status to sectarian
schools which practice racial discrimination based upon sincere
religious beliefs. This Note concludes that the state has a com-
pelling interest in the elimination of racial discrimination in pri-
vate schools which outweighs the first amendment freedom of re-
ligion rights of individuals and institutions who hold religious be-
liefs requiring the practice of racial segregation.
II. STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO DENY TAX EXEMPTION
TO DISCRIMINATORY SCHOOLS
The landmark case interpreting I.R.C. section 501 as allow-
ing the IRS to deny tax-exempt status to discriminatory private
schools is Green v. Connally.4 The court held that granting tax-
exempt status to private schools practicing discrimination is con-
trary to federal policy prohibiting racial segregation in the ed-
41 [1982 Report Bulletin 6] Fed. Taxes (P-H) 60,043.
42 [1982 Report Bulletin 8] Fed. Taxes (P-H) 60,063.
43 Id. A federal judge in Washington told the justice department it would be in con-
tempt of court if it continued to grant tax-exemptions to private segregated schools in Mis-
sissippi because of the continuing injunction granted in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp.
at 1150. See Congressional Quarterly, Vol. 40 No. 6, 209 (Feb. 6, 1982).
44 N.Y. Times, Feb. 26,1982, at 1, col. 1.
45 330 F. Supp. at 1150.
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ucational system. 4 Two additional criteria relied upon in Green
v. Connally to find statutory authority to deny tax-exemption
were the charitable trust theory for section 501, 47 and the public
benefit theory. 48 The following discussion deals with the legisla-
tive history of section 501, and analyzes these three justifications
in support of a construction of section 501 that would permit the
IRS to deny tax exemptions to discriminatory private schools.
The district court in Bob Jones University v. United States
(Bob Jones 1) questioned the authority of the IRS to enforce the
nondiscrimination requirements, arguing that there was nothing
in the language of the relevant statutes or regulations that could
be construed as granting such authority. 49 The district court fur-
ther asserted, and the Fourth Circuit dissenting judge agreed on
appeal, 50 that Bob Jones University was primarily a religious or-
ganization under section 501(c)(3) and thus the IRS requirement
of nondiscrimination for private schools did not apply to it.-' As
the majority of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in its
decision (Bob Jones II), such a simplistic reading of the statute
"tears section 501 (c) (3) from its roots."52
The literal interpretation of the statute suggested in Bob
46 Id. at 1161-64. The Green v. Connally court placed primary reliance upon the
federal public policy analysis:
Taking into account the sensitive and crucial nature of the issue of ra-
cially discriminatory schools and the existence, as we shall relate, of a fed-
eral policy derived from Congressional enactment as well as the Constitu-
tion itself, it is our conclusion that the ultimate criterion for determination
whether such schools are eligible under the "charitable" organization provi-
sions of the Code rests not on a common law referent but on that Federal
policy.
Id. at 1161 (emphasis added).
47 See notes 67-68 and the accompanying text infra for a discussion of the charitable
trust theory.
48 See notes 55, 69-70 and the accompanying text infra for a discussion of the public
benefit theory.
49 468 F. Supp. at 901-02.
50 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d at 156 (Widener, J., dissenting).
51 468 F. Supp. at 897. The district court's analysis is unduly restrictive. The Su-
preme Court has pointed out in several cases that religious schools "pursue two goals, reli-
gious instruction and secular education." Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245
(1968); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,468 (1973) (quoting Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. at 245).
52 639 F.2d at 151.
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Jones I and by the dissent in Bob Jones H, is inconsistent with the
legislative history of section 501(c)(3). This history indicates a
legislative attempt to meet the requirement that an exemption
provide a public benefit. Thus, one finds congressional records
that state:
The exemption from taxation of money and property devoted
to charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that
the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its
relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be
met by appropriations from other public funds and by the
benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.0
In Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States,54 the
district court pointed out that the legislative history of section
501 suggests that private institutions must provide a "quid pro
quo" for the benefits they receive. Furthermore, legislative de-
bates on a bill designed to eliminate tax-exemption provisions for
racially discriminatory private social clubs reveal a legislative
recognition that Green v. Connally provides the guidelines for
determining the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory
schools.s As one commentator has remarked, these debates re-
flect "a congressional determination that racial discrimination
not be supported by tax exemptions for either educational organ-
izations or fraternal societies."5
Outside the context of charitable organizations, there are
public policy constraints on the granting of a tax deduction.Y7 In
3 H.R. REP. No. 1820,75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1939) (emphasis added). The prede-
cessor sections of the current charitable deduction provisions demonstrate that the public
benefits generated comprise the underlying rationale for providing charitable deductions.
For a thorough analysis of the derivation of section 501 see Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status
of Racially Discriminatory Schools, 36TAx L. Rav. 477,485-86(1981).
4 436 F. Supp. 1314,1318 (E.D.N.C. 1977), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981).
See S. REP. No. 94-1318, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 7, 8 & n.5 (1976). Section 501(i) of
the Internal Revenue Code was added in 1976 to deny tax-exempt status to social clubs
which discriminated on the basis of race. In enacting the amendment, Congress "over-
ruled" McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972), which held that social
clubs with racially discriminatory membership policies were eligible for tax exemptions
despite their policies.
56 Note, supra note 3, at 389.
57 See generally Simon, supra note 53, at 496-500; Neuberger and Crumplar, Tax
Exempt Religious Schools Under Attack: Conflicting Goals of Religious Freedom and Ra-
cial Integration, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 229,240-44 (1979-80).
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Tank Truck Rental, Inc. v. Commissioner," the Supreme Court
disallowed the deduction of fines for violations of highway max-
imum weight laws as a necessary business expense.59 The Court
held that "[a] finding of 'necessity" cannot be made... if allow-
ance of the deduction would frustrate sharply defined national or
state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced
by some governmental declaration thereof." Furthermore, the
Court asserted that in allowing deductions, Congress did not in-
tend to encourage the beneficiary to violate the public policy of
the state.6' The test of nondeductibility chosen by the Court fo-
cused on the severity and immediacy of the frustration which
would result from allowance of the deduction.62
In Bob Jones I, the district court stated that the relationship
between the tax benefit and frustration of federal policy was re-
mote.A This view is contrary to a plethora of cases64 which ac-
knowledge that granting benefits to discriminatory schools al-
lows them to thrive, and thus thwarts the mandate of Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka. In addition, although the re-
quirement that the frustrated policy be evidenced by a govern-
mental declaration was met in Bob Jones University's situation
by Title VI of the Civil Bights Act,6 the district court in Bob
Jones I refused to apply the Tank Truck doctrine because a com-
plete denial of tax exemption to an organization was involved
rather than the denial of a deduction for specific expenses. 6
Another theory supporting the statutory authority to deny
tax-exempt status to discriminatory schools is the common law
doctrine of charitable trusts relied upon in Green v. ConnallyY
58 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
59 Id. at 34-35.
'o Id. at33-34.
61 Id. at 35.
62 Id.
63 468 F. Supp. at 903. Contra Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d at 152
(Fourth Circuit majority criticizing the district court's finding that the relationship be-
tween the frustration of public policy and exemption was too remote).
64 See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1976).
66 468 F. Supp. at 902. The Fourth Circuit in Bob Jones II, however, did not con-
strue the public policy doctrine so narrowly. See 639 F.2d at 151.
67 330 F. Supp. at 1157-60. Senator Helms has labeled erroneous the Green v. Con-
nally court's assumption that all educational activities fall within a general class of charit-
1981-82]
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Under the charitable trust doctrine, if the activities of an organ-
ization are contrary to public policy, it cannot qualify as a char-
ity. The majority in Bob Jones II agreed with Judge Leventhal's
conclusion in Green v. Connally, and stated that "to be eligible
under that section [501(c)(3)], an institution must be 'charitable'
in the broad common law sense, and therefore must not violate
public policy."" The racial policies of Bob Jones University vi-
olated public policy forbidding racial discrimination in private
or public education.m The Green v. Connally court noted that
the public policy doctrine is a necessary qualification to the idea
that educational trusts inure to the benefit of the community;
otherwise, "Fagin's school for pickpockets would qualify for a
charitable trust." 70
The conclusion of the district court that Bob Jones University
is primarily a religious organization and therefore not subject to
the non-discrimination requirement distorts reality. Bob Jones
University exists and operates as an institution of learning,7' al-
beit with a pervasive religious character. It has pupils and a full-
time faculty and staff, and it charges tuition. 72 Despite its strong
religious orientation, to state that "Bob Jones University cannot
be termed a sectarian school, for it composes its own religious or-
der"73 is to deny the school's own characterization as a university.
As the Fourth Circuit noted, although Bob Jones University has
admitted blacks since 1975, its disciplinary code is clearly dis-
criminatory.74 It discriminates against both whites and blacks
able pursuits governed by I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) rather than within a class distinct from char-
ities. 125 CONG. REC. S11835 (daily ed. Sept. 5, 1979). For a general discussion of the
charitable trust doctrine, see Nelkin, CyPres and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Discrim-
inating Look at Very Private Schools and Not So Charitable Trusts, 56 GEo. L.J. 272
(1967); Reiling, "What is a Charitable OrganizationP", 44 A.B.A. J. 525 (1958); Spratt,
Federal Tax Exemption for Private Segregated Schools: the Crumbling Foundation, 12
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1970-71).
68 639 F.2d at 151 (footnote omitted).
69 Id.
70 330 F. Supp. at 1160.
71 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. at 893.
72 Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. at 600.
73 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. at 895.
74 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d at 152. The Fourth Circuit noted:
That discrimination on the basis of racial affiliation or companionship is a
form of racial discrimination is clear from Equal Protection cases such as
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who are either married to or associate in a dating relationship
with members of the other race.
Thus, the only remaining statutory question is whether the
IRS requirement applies to schools that have religious affiliation
and practice racial discrimination as a result of their religious be-
liefs. The practice of racial discrimination in schools on the basis
of religious faith immediately raises competing constitutional
concerns which the IRS itself is not equipped to resolve.' 5 Upon
weighing these constitutional concerns, the Fourth Circuit in
Bob Jones II was correct in deciding not to make an exception for
religious-based schools. Judge Widener, in the dissent, stated
that the IRS could not revoke the religious exemption granted by
statute by using as a basis the fact that the racial policies of Bob
Jones University were not in accord with public policy: "[tihe
question... is whether the admitted public policy of the nation
favoring freedom of religion as expressed in the First Amendment
is to be limited by a public policy assuring'... . that Americans
will not be providing indirect support for any educational organ-
ization that discriminates on the basis of race."' 7 6 The dissent's
balancing of the first amendment claim against the equal protec-
tion claim is the correct approach; as will be explained in section
III of this Note, however, the dissent's conclusion is incorrect.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817,18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967) (law
prohibiting interracial marriage unconstitutional) and McLaughlin v. Flor-
ida, 379 U.S. 184, 85 S. Ct. 283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964) (interracial cohab-
itation law invalid), as well as § 1981 decisions, see Tillman v. Wheaton
Haven Recreational Association, 410 U.S. 431, 93 S. Ct. 1090, 35 L.Ed.2d
403 (1973) (white club member expelled for bringing black guests); Faraca
v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1006, 95 S.
Ct. 2627, 45 L.Ed.2d 669 (1976) (white man denied employment because
wife was black).
Id.
75 This problem was raised by Justice Rehnquist when he dissented from the denial
of certiorari in Prince Edward School Foundation v. Commissioner, 478 F. Supp. 107
(D.D.C. 1979), a f'd, No. 79-1622 (D.C. Cir. July 30, 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 944,
948 (1981). However, Green v. Connally, Runyon, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are
the controlling principles to guide the IRS until a different approach is indicated by the
legislature or the courts.
76 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d at 157 (Widener, J., dissenting).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The delineation between private and public conduct is firmly
established in constitutional law.7 The Supreme Court has em-
phasized the "essential dichotomy"7 8 between discriminatory ac-
tion by the state, which is prohibited by the equal protection
clause, and offensive private action, against which the clause
"erects no shield."79 The concept of state action arising from
granting tax-exemption benefits is fairly new. It arose with the
development of the concept of "tax expenditure" in economic
theory.e
On the one hand, a grant of tax exemption "subsidies" to dis-
criminatory private schools raises the issue of state action and the
resultant denial of equal protection to the parties discriminated
against by the schools. 8' On the other hand, the denial of such
subsidies to private religious schools such as Bob Jones University
which discriminate on the basis of race raises concerns about in-
fringement of the free exercise rights of the organization. Fur-
thermore, the denial of tax exemption benefits to select groups es-
pousing certain religious beliefs suggests government sponsorship
of religions that are in accordance with government policy, and
thus potentially affronts the establishment clause. The foregoing
issues must be resolved if the controversy about Bob Jones Uni-
versity is to be properly decided.
77 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-11 (1883). See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 5-15, 18-1 to 18-7 (1978).
78 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. at 172.
79 Shelleyv. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,13 (1948).
80 See Brown, State Action Analysis of Tax Expenditures, 11 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 97, 104 (1976). A tax expenditure, including both exemptions and deductions is de-
fined as "revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a
special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special
credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability." The Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,31 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976).
81 The plaintiff in Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. at 1127, brought a class action to
enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury and Commissioner of Internal Revenue from accord-
ing tax-exempt status to discriminatory private schools in Mississippi, claiming that tax-
exempt status was not permitted under sections 170 and 501(c)(3) or alternatively, that if
granting tax-exempt status was permissible under the I.R.C., sections 170 and 501(c)(3)
were unconstitutional. 309 F. Supp. at 1130. See also Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. at
1155.
[Vol. 70
TAXEs AND DISCRIMINATORY SCHOOLS
A. Equal Protection Considerations
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of
whether granting segregated private schools benefits under sec-
tion 501(c)(3) violates the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth or, by incorporation, the fifth amendment.82 The Su-
preme Court has refused to hear a case83 which presented the
question of what type of showing a private school must make to
prove that its admission policies are nondiscriminatory. Bob
Jones is the first case in which the Court will address the constitu-
tionality of according tax benefits to discriminatory sectarian
schools.
Assuming, arguendo, that Bob Jones University's racial pol-
icies are the result of deep and sincere religious convictions, the
question is whether granting a tax exemption to the--niversity
constitutes impermissible state action "foster[ing] and encour-
ag[ing]"1 discrimination, or whether such a grant falls within
the bounds of "benevolent neutrality."s The Supreme Court's
concern for this distinction is underscored by its imposition in
Washington v. Davis,8 6 of the requirement that proof of purpose-
ful governmental discrimination be part of an equal protection
claim based upon disparate impact. Because the government was
aware of the racial classification that resulted from the school's
policies, purposeful discrimination can be found in granting the
University tax-exempt status.81
In the establishment clause context, the Court has found that
a tax exemption, when applied to religious organizations, in-
82 The Supreme Court declined the opportunity to decide the issue in Bob Jones
Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. at 725. The Court stated: "The question of whether a segrega-
tive private school qualifies under § 501(c)(3) has not received plenary review in this
Court, and we do not reach that question today." Id. at 740 n.11.
83 450 U.S. at 944 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Prince Ed-
ward School had refused to publicize its racially nondiscriminatory admissions policy and
no blacks were enrolled, so the IRS revoked its tax-exempt status. The school claimed that
no blacks had ever applied for admission and that it had not discouraged blacks from ap-
plying).
84 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. at 176-77.
8 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,669 (1970).
s 426 U.S. 229,240 (1976).
87 See Comment, The Tax-Exempt Status of Sectarian Educational Institutions That
Discrlminate on the Basis of Race, 65 IowA L. REV. 258,264-65 (1979-80).
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volves a degree of governmental involvement sufficient to raise
constitutional questions 8 In Committee for Public Education v.
Nyquist,89 the Court noted that tax expenditures and direct ex-
penditures are equivalent in practical terms. The Court has
never directly addressed the tax-expenditure issue in the equal
protection context. 90 But the Court's acceptance of direct expen-
ditures and tax exemptions as equivalent for constitutional pur-
poses, and the unequivocal prohibition against direct expendi-
tures for discriminatory educational institutions found in Title
VI make a strong case for finding state action in the equal protec-
tion context.
While the Supreme Court has not reviewed the con-
stitutionality of tax exemptions under the equal protection
clause, the Court has found other types of assistance programs to
be unconstitutional. In Norwood v. Harrison,91 the Court held
that a Mississippi textbook loan program contravened the equal
protection clause because textbooks were provided for students in
both private and public schools with no attempt to determine
whether the schools maintained racially neutral policies. The
Court clearly stated: "That the Constitution may compel toler-
ation of private discrimination in some circumstances does not
mean that it requires state support for such discrimination.."92 In
arriving at this conclusion, the Court implicitly invoked a
broader standard for finding state action in the racial discrimina-
88 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 674-75.
8' 413 U.S. 756,790-91 (1973).
90 See note 82 supra for citation to a United States Supreme Court decision indicating
that the Court has never addressed the tax expenditure issue in the equal protection con-
text.
91 413 U.S. 455, 461-63 (1973).
92 Id. at 463. Cf. Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp.
1182 (D. Conn. 1974), in which the court stated:
It is one thing to sue on Fourteenth Amendment grounds to halt state assis-
tance to an otherwise private entity; it is quite another to seek on those
grounds to restrain the entity in its own conduct. If the later suit is success-
ful, the entity may have no choice but to alter its practices; if the former suit
is successful, the entity can choose between continuing to practice racial dis-
crimination at the cost of forfeiting further state assistance, or abandoning
its discriminatory practices and policies so that the state might constitution-
ally continue its assistance.
Id. at 1189-91.
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tion context than in the establishment clause context. 93
Whereas the "benevolent neutrality" 94 of affording the same
benefits to all institutions was tolerated in the establishment
clause context in Board of Education v. Allen,9 5 the same benev-
olence did not survive equal protection scrutiny in Norwood.
This comparison strongly suggests that "[i]n a situation like that
in Bob Jones, a tax exemption that may have survived the benev-
olent neutrality standard developed for the establishment clause
must be scrutinized under the standard of strict government neu-
trality developed for the equal protection clause." 6 The Fourth
Circuit in Bob Jones II quite properly perceived that by continu-
ing to recognize the tax-exempt status of Bob Jones University,
the IRS risks placing the federal government in a position of un-
constitutionally encouraging and supporting racial discrimina-
tion.7
B. First Amendment Considerations
Bob Jones University contended that the denial of tax exemp-
tion violated its right to the free exercise of religion by forcing it
to choose between practicing its religion and sacrificing a valu-
able government benefit." In Braunfeld v. Brown,99 a case in-
volving a Sunday closing law, Chief Justice Warren noted that
"the statute at bar does not make unlawful any religious practices
of appellants; the Sunday [closing] law simply regulates a secular
activity and, as applied to appellants, operates so as to make the
practice of their religious beliefs more expensive.' ' 10 Although
this reasoning logically applies to Bob Jones, the district court re-
lied upon Sherbert v. Verner,'10 which may have implicitly over-
93 See Comment, supra note 87, at 269 n.97 for a comparison of two recent Supreme
Court cases indicating that when racial discrimination is alleged, the threshold for a find-
ing of state action is lower than when the establishment clause is involved.
94 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 676.
9 392 U.S. at236.
96 Comment, supra note 87, at 269.
97 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d at 151.
98 Id. at 153.
9' 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
100 Id. at 605.
101 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
1981-82]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70
ruled Braunjeld,02 and held that the IRS' actions contravened
the free exercise clause. 103
In Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church
was denied unemployment benefits after she had been dis-
charged for refusing to work on Saturday, the Sabbath of her re-
ligion. The Court held that the free exercise clause prohibits the
government from forcing an individual to choose between either
forfeiting a benefit in order to follow her religious beliefs, or
abandoning a religious principle in order to accept work. 10 Both
Sherbert and Bob Jones involve the withholding of an economic
benefit from, rather than the imposition of a direct burden on,
the aggrieved party. However, the Sherbert Court acknowledged
that a compelling state interest would justify infringing upon the
private actor's first amendment right. 10 The Fourth Circuit cor-
rectly decided to balance the interest asserted by the government
against the burden on the practice of the religion created by the
denial of tax-exempt status. 106 Eliminating racial discrimination
in education, the asserted governmental interest in Bob Jones, is
a compelling interest, unlike the cost-saving and efficiency justi-
fications presented in Sherbert.10
102 See Kauper, The Warren Court: Religious Liberty and Church-State Relations,
67 MICH. L. REv. 269, 287-88 (1968-69) (suggesting that Sherbert in fact overruled Braun-
feld despite the fact that the Supreme Court distinguished Braunfeld in Sherbert).
103 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. at 898.
104 374 U.S. at 404. Another case presenting a similar free exercise claim is Thomas
v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment See. Div., 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981). In Thomas, a Je-
hovah Witness terminated his employment when he was transferred to a department that
produced military parts. He filed for unemployment benefits claiming that his religious
beliefs prohibited him from producing weapons, and his claim was denied. The Supreme
Court held that its decision in Sherbert was dispositive because the coercive impact on
Thomas' free exercise rights was of the same magnitude:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of
conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden
upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringe-
ment upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.
Id. at 1432.
105 See 374 U.S. at 406. Accord, Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment See.
Div., 101 S. Ct. at 1432 ("The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing
that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.").
106 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d at 153.
107 The only justification offered by the state in Sherbert was the possibility of fraud-
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Various tests have been suggested to determine which
competing interest must prevail in any given situation. 1° The im-
portant elements of the tests are: (a) the importance of the sec-
ular value underlying the governmental regulation; (b) the de-
gree to which the regulation is necessitated by the underlying
value; (c) the degree to which the governmental regulation inter-
feres with the religious practice in question; and, (d) the impact
of allowing exemptions for religious reasons.3 9
The countervailing secular value in Bob Jones is the govern-
mental interest in preventing racial discrimination in education.
Its importance is underscored by Justice Stewart's observation
that "[t]he policy of the Nation as formulated by the Congress in
recent years has moved constantly in the direction of eliminating
racial segregation in all sectors of society."' Thus, the govern-
ment should not place itself in the position of unconstitutionally
supporting racially discriminatory schools. Because a tax-exemp-
tion is a form of government subsidy"' it should therefore be de-
nied to schools which practice racial discrimination. Denial of
the exemption does not force Bob Jones University to abandon its
religious belief that racial intermingling is prohibited by the
Bible. Furthermore, if the university permits interracial couples
to attend in order to receive the tax exemption, it can continue to
preach about the evils of miscegenation.
ulent claims based upon religious beliefs which would dilute the unemployment fund. 374
U.S. at 407. A mere rational relationship to the state interest was not sufficient to justify
the burden on the free exercise of religion. Id. at 406. Accord, Thomas v. Review Bd. of
the Ind. Employment See. Div., 101 S. Ct. at 1432.
108 See, e.g., Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Develop-
ment, Part I, The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1381, 1389-90 (1966-
67). But see Clark, Guidelinesfor the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REv. 327, 329-44
(1969). See also Note, Racial Discrimination in Private Schools, Section 1981, and the Free
Exercise of Religion: the Sectarian Loophole of Runyon v. McCrary, 48 U. COLO. L. REv.
419,421 (1976-77); Comment, Section 1981 After Runyon v. McCrary: The Free Exercise
Right of Private Sectarian Schools to Deny Admission to Blacks on Account of Race, 1977
DUKE L.J. 1219.
109 Gianella, supra note 108, at 1389-90. There is an additional element in Gianella's
balancing test, namely, the sincerity and importance of the religious practice for which
special protection is claimed. This inquiry is not necessary in the Bob Jones case because
the district court found that Bob Jones University's religious beliefs were genuine. Bob
Jones v. United States, 468 F. Supp. at 894.
110 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. at 191 (Stewart, J., concurring).
111 See note 80 supra and the accompanying text for a definition of tax expenditure.
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The impact upon educational desegregation of allowing
exemptions to schools which discriminate for religious reasons is
potentially catastrophic. Nonsectarian private schools that dis-
criminate on the basis of race would only need to assert a dis-
criminatory religious belief in order to avoid the proscription of
Runyon. As some courts have recognized, the proliferation of ra-
cially segregated private schools could block the effective integra-
tion of public schools.112 Furthermore, the government could find
itself in the unsavory position of examining whether a private
school's beliefs are in fact religious, a determination which the
Supreme Court has always been reluctant to make 13 and one
which the IRS is not qualified to make." 4
Applying the above criteria to Bob Jones, it is evident that
the government's interest is a compelling one. As the Fourth Cir-
cuit noted:
[T]ihe government's rule would not prohibit the University
from adhering to its policy. Abandonment of the policy would
not prevent the University from teaching the Scriptural doc-
trine of nonmiscegenation. Nor is any individual student at
Bob Jones University forced to personally violate his beliefs; no
student is forced to date or marry outside his race. We think
these factors tip the balance in favor of the Services' nondis-
crimination doctrine."5
The dissent in Bob Jones II relied upon Wisconsin v. Yoder"6
to reach the conclusion that the government's actions violated the
free exercise clause. In Yoder, the Supreme Court held that a
state's interest in compulsory education was not so compelling as
to require that the established practices of the Amish yield to a
state law mandating school attendance until the age of 16."1 The
Court found that because the religious practices of the Amish
112 Cook v. Hudson, 365 F. Supp. 855,860 (N.D. Miss. 1973), affd per curiam, 511
F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 165 (1976).
113 See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,86 (1944) (only the sincerity of a
religious belief can be examined, not its "truth or verity").
114 See note 75 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the inability of the
IRS to make these determinations.
115 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d at 153-54.
1'6 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
117 Id. at 221-29.
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would cause their children to miss no more than two years of
compulsory education, such practice would not impair the physi-
cal or mental health of the Amish children, nor result in an in-
ability of the children to be self supporting or to discharge the
duties of citizenship, nor otherwise materially detract from soci-
etal welfare. u 8 The same is not true of Bob Jones University's sit-
uation. Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged in Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka that "[t]o separate... [children]
from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way un-
likely ever to be undone.""' 9
In addition to the free exercise claim, the district court in Bob
Jones I held that the denial of tax-exempt status to schools that
discriminate resulted in the "government favoring those churches
that adhere to federal policy, more specifically, in this case, those
churches whose religious beliefs do not forbid interracial mar-
riage." 120 Denying a governmental exemption for religious
reasons can pose serious establishment clause problems, which
become particularly acute when the government attempts to leg-
islate morality in a way which coincides with the "aspirational
aspects of [the] morality" of the majority.12' A statute that has a
secular purpose, however, does not violate the establishment
clause, even if applied in a religious context.
What constitutes a secular purpose is best exemplified by
McGowan v. Maryland.2 In McGowan, the Court found that
the Sunday closing laws had a secular purpose even though they
have religious roots and Sunday is a day of special religious signif-
icance. The Court noted that "[t]he present purpose and effect of
[the Sunday closing laws] is to provide a uniform day of rest for
all citizens."'' The McGowan case is dispositive of the secular
purpose of the IRS. As the Fourth Circuit properly noted, the un-
deniable secular purpose of the IRS rulings is to eliminate racial
118 Id.
119 347 U.S. at494.
120 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. at 900.
121 Gianella, supra note 108, at 1403.
122 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
123 Id. at 445.
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discrimination in education.1 2 The fact that the practice of the
IRS is not burdensome to those religions that do not forbid inter-
racial marriage is purely coincidental. The establishment clause
prevents direct "involvement of religious with secular institu-
tions."2 5
When the Supreme Court sustained tax exemptions for
religious property in Walz v. Commissioner,26 it properly recog-
nized that property tax exemptions would necessitate less govern-
mental entanglement with religion than tax collecting would.
However, if the IRS grants tax exemptions to private schools
which racially discriminate on the basis of claimed religious be-
liefs, it places itself in the position of performing "inspection and
evaluation of the religious content of a religious organization."' '
This necessary examination would result in excessive entangle-
ment with religion as opposed to non-entanglement if there was a
blanket denial of tax-exempt status to all discriminatory schools.
A recent Supreme Court case presented an issue similar to
that in Bob Jones. In Harris v. McRae,12 the Court held that a
woman's freedom of choice to terminate her pregnancy did not
carry with it a "constitutional entitlement to the financial re-
sources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices."'M
The Court also rejected an establishment clause objection to the
Hyde Amendment which restricted funding for abortions. It was
claimed that the Hyde Amendment violated the establishment
clause because it incorporated into law the doctrines of the
Roman Catholic Church. The Court held that "the fact that the
funding restrictions in the Hyde Amendment may coincide with
the religious tenets of the Roman Catholic Church does not,
without more, contravene the Establishment Clause." 13
By analogy, therefore, the fact that Bob Jones University
may have a valid first amendment interest does not mandate that
the federal government provide financial support for its exercise.
Likewise, the fact that other religions may benefit from the tax
124 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d at 154.
125 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at409.
126 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970).
127 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,620 (1971).
128 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
129 Id. at 316.
'30 Id. at 319-20.
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deduction and exemption provisions does not mean that the es-
tablishment clause has been affronted.
CONCLUSION
The government affords tax exemptions to various "charit-
able" organizations whose existence and operation are believed
to enhance societal functions, directly or indirectly. This is the
basis for the provisions on charitable exemptions and deductions
of the I.R.C., the roots of which exist in medieval English com-
mon law.'3' As noted by Judge Leventhal in Green v. Connally,
"[a]nalysis of the contribtion of a [charitable] trust purpose to the
benefit of the community must take into account broad prin-
ciples of the general welfare, as expounded, inter alia, in consti-
tutions, statutes, and court decisions."'
The principles currently operative in this society are
unassailably aimed at elimination of racial discrimination in all
sectors, particularly in educational institutions. Withholding the
privilege of tax-exemption from educational institutions practic-
ing racial discrimination on whatever basis is not only permis-
sible, but is mandated by law and by the Constitution. Any at-
tendant potential abridgement of the offenders' rights is out-
weighed by the government's compelling interest in insuring its
citizens of equal protection under the law irrespective of race.
Kathleen McDonough
131 See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. at 1158.
132 Id. at 1159.
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